The hike cycle is real — but at NT$816 the stock already trades at 26× consensus 2027 earnings. Most of the good news is in the price. 漲價循環是真的 — 但 816 元已是共識 2027 年獲利的 26 倍,好消息大多已反映在股價裡。
Note: the asterisk in "國巨*" is TWSE's display marker for non-NT$10 par value (1-for-4 split effective 2025-08-25). 註:「國巨*」的星號 = 台灣證交所用來標示「面額非 NT$10」的顯示規則(2025-08-25 生效一拆四)。
Fundamental momentum: 2Q26 self-reported revenue NT$44.46bn (QoQ +16.5%, YoY +35.7%, all-time high) ✓; 7/1 across-the-board capacitor hikes of 30–80%, the first round to include direct OEM/EMS accounts ✓; industry book-to-bill 1.25–1.31, above the 2018 peak ✓.
基本面動能:2Q26 自結營收 NT$444.6億(QoQ +16.5%、YoY +35.7%,歷史新高)✓;7/1 全電容產品線漲價 30–80%,首次含直供 OEM/EMS ✓;產業 B/B 值 1.25–1.31,已越過 2018 高點 ✓。
Earnings & estimates: 1Q26 gross margin 38.1% (14-quarter high), EPS 3.90 (quarterly record) ✓. This analysis models 2026/2027 EPS at 19.4/26.5 ◆ — the 2026 figure lands almost exactly on FactSet's refreshed consensus median of 19.59 ✓ 07; the entire disagreement is 2027 ASP durability once Japan/Korea/China capacity arrives.
獲利與估計:1Q26 毛利率 38.1%(14季新高)、EPS 3.90(單季新高)✓。本研究估 2026/2027 EPS 19.4/26.5 ◆ — 2026 與 FactSet 最新共識中位數 19.59 幾乎相同 ✓ 07;分歧全在 2027 年日韓+中國新產能落地後的 ASP 持續性。
Positioning & price: the stock fell 33% in six sessions (1,220→816) on 投信 selling, two settlement-default waves (NT$38.8M on 6/30, then NT$41.31M across 13 brokers) and disposition-list aftermath — chips came off the table, not the fundamentals ✓. Even post-crash, 816 ≈ 26× consensus 2027E EPS ◆; the gap between FactSet's consensus TP of 1,275 ✓ and this analysis's 585 ◆ is exactly what the rest of this page argues out.
籌碼與價格:股價 6 個交易日 -33%(1,220→816):投信調節+兩波違約交割(6/30 NT$3,880萬、其後跨13家券商 NT$4,131萬)+處置股後遺症 — 跌的是籌碼,不是基本面 ✓。即使跌完,816 仍≈ 26× 共識 2027E EPS ◆;FactSet 共識目標價 1,275 ✓ 與本研究 585 ◆ 之間的差距,正是本文其餘章節要處理的問題。
(1) The AI crowd-out effect is the real mechanism behind this hike cycle (Japan/Korea's high-end capacity pivots to AI, and the standard-part gap spills to Yageo/Walsin) — structurally better than 2018's panic-buying repeat. But the other half of the mechanism is equally real: 2027 capacity from Murata/SEMCO/Taiyo Yuden plus China's Sanhuan/风华 — at which point standard-part ASPs carry a 15–25% giveback risk (TrendForce/vocus). (2) Yageo is no longer "an MLCC company": MLCC is only 19% of revenue; magnetics (25.2%) + tantalum (24.3%, world #1 polymer tantalum, >40% capacity, >30% AI-related) are the real body of the business — the market is pricing an "MLCC super-cycle" onto a company that is 68% non-MLCC, overstating pricing elasticity and understating mix resilience. (3) Split-adjusted, 2026E EPS (~19–20) roughly equals the 2018 cycle-peak EPS (80.3÷4 = 20.1), but the price of 816 is 2.5× the 2018 peak price (1,310÷4 = 327.5) — the market is paying a 2.5× premium for "this time it's structural"; this analysis judges the premium half-justified (premium mix rising 30%→75–80%, product diversification) and half momentum.
(1) AI 排擠效應是本輪漲價的真實機制(日韓高階產能轉向 AI,標準品缺口流向國巨/華新科),結構上優於 2018 的恐慌性重複下單;但機制的另一半 — 2027 年 Murata/SEMCO/太誘新產能 + 中國三環/風華擴產 — 同樣真實,屆時標準品 ASP 有 15–25% 回吐風險(TrendForce/vocus)。(2) 國巨已不是 MLCC 公司:MLCC 僅佔營收 19%,磁性 25.2% + 鉭電容 24.3%(聚合物鉭全球 #1、>40% 產能、>30% AI 相關)才是本體 — 市場用「MLCC 超級循環」定價一家 68% 非 MLCC 的公司,高估了漲價彈性、低估了組合韌性。(3) 分割調整後 2026E EPS(~19–20)≈ 2018 循環頂點 EPS(80.3÷4=20.1),但股價 816 = 2018 頂點(1,310÷4=327.5)的 2.5 倍 — 市場為「這次是結構性」付了 2.5 倍溢價;本研究認為溢價一半有理(premium mix 30%→75–80%、產品多元化),一半是動能。
TP:目標價: This analysis models 2026/2027 EPS at NT$19.4/26.5; 12-month target price NT$585, based on 2027E EPS × 22× PER. The past three years' PER band runs roughly 10–20× (2018 peak ~16×); 22× is granted because premium mix and AI structural content run higher than history — but below external houses' 26–40×, since that multiple implies 2028 continues to compound, an unproven option in this analysis's view. 本研究預估 2026、2027 年 EPS 19.4、26.5 元,12個月目標價 585 元,基於 2027E EPS × 22 倍 PER;過去三年 PER 區間約 10–20 倍(2018 頂點 ~16 倍),給予 22 倍係因 premium mix 與 AI 結構性成分高於歷史,但低於外資 26–40 倍 — 該倍數隱含 2028 續強,本研究視為未證實選擇權。 ◆
Risk factors (upside risk to this "avoid" view): 2H26 direct-supply contract hikes landing above 40%; a full Q4'26 shortage (TrendForce's flagged critical window); Japan/Korea 2027 capacity slipping; Rubin-generation content doubling arriving early.
風險因子(對本研究「迴避」觀點的風險=上行風險):2H26 直供合約漲價 >40% 落地、Q4'26 全面缺貨(TrendForce 關鍵窗口)、日韓 2027 產能遞延、Rubin 世代含量倍增提前。
| NT$M except per-share (post-split)NT$百萬,每股例外(分割後) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026E | 2027E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue營業收入 | ~121,300 | 107,609 | 121,667 | 132,930 | 186,100 ◆ | 227,000 ◆ |
| Revenue YoY營收 YoY | +5.7% | -11.3% | +13.1% | +9.3% | +40.0% ◆ | +22.0% ◆ |
| Gross margin毛利率 | 38.01% | 33.48% | 34.36% | 36.21% | 40.9% ◆ | 44.0% ◆ |
| Operating margin營業利益率 | 23.94% | 18.99% | 19.22% | 22.42% | 27.9% ◆ | 31.0% ◆ |
| Net income (parent)稅後純益(母) | ~22,900 | 17,427 | 19,356 | 23,634 | 40,200 ◆ | 55,000 ◆ |
| EPS (NT$) | 11.06 | 8.48 | 9.41 | 11.51 | 19.4 ◆ | 26.5 ◆ |
| PER (yr-avg price / EPS)PER(年均價/EPS) | ~11× | ~13.6× | ~13.8× | ~13× | 42.1× ✓ live | 30.8× ✓ live |
| Dividend (NT$)股息(元) | 2.50 | 5.48* | 5.00 | 6.00 | ~10 ◆ | — |
| ROE | — | 13.54% | 10.07% | 14.89% | ~21% ◆ | ~25% ◆ |
| Item項目 | Assumption假設 | Grounds依據 |
|---|---|---|
| 2026E revenue 186,100 (+40.0%)2026E 營收 186,100(+40.0%) | 1H26 actual 82,622 ✓ + 3Q26E 50,000 (QoQ +12.5%) + 4Q26E 53,500 (QoQ +7%)1H26 實際 82,622 ✓ + 3Q26E 50,000(QoQ +12.5%)+ 4Q26E 53,500(QoQ +7%) | 7/1 hikes bill from 3Q; utilization guided std 75% / specialty 85% ✓; AGM guided 2H book-to-bill ~1.3 ✓7/1 漲價自 3Q 起入帳;公司稼動率指引標準品 75%/特殊品 85% ✓;AGM 指引 2H B/B 約 1.3 ✓ |
| 2026E GM 40.3%2026E 毛利率 40.3% | quarterly path 39.3 → 41.5 → 43.5%季路徑 39.3 → 41.5 → 43.5% | company guided a "small sequential increase" for 2Q ✓; 1Q26 call: "price adjustments beginning to be gradually reflected" ✓; the 30–80% July list hikes flow through with shipment lag ◆公司指引 2Q「小幅季增」✓;1Q26 法說:「價格調整效果開始逐步反映」✓;7/1 的 30–80% 牌價漲幅隨出貨遞延反映 ◆ |
| 2027E revenue 227,000 (+22.0%)2027E 營收 227,000(+22.0%) | full-year hike carryover + AI mix >20%漲價全年化+AI 佔比 >20% | Japan/Korea new capacity only reaches output in 2027 ✓ → the standard-part gap persists at least through 1H27 ◆日韓新產能 2027 年才投產 ✓ → 標準品缺口至少延續至 1H27 ◆ |
| 2027E GM 44.0%2027E 毛利率 44.0% | below GS 46% / MS ~50%低於 GS 46%/MS 約 50% | assumes hike momentum stalls mid-2027 as Murata/SEMCO/Taiyo Yuden + China capacity lands ✓ plans, with no 4Q27 ASP giveback modeled yet ◆假設 2027 年中漲價動能熄火(村田/三星電機/太陽誘電+中國產能落地 ✓ 計畫),尚未計入 4Q27 ASP 回吐 ◆ |
*2023 dividend incl. stock component (pre-split 19.972 cash + 1.948 stock, ÷4). 2022 rev/NI backed out of company USD disclosure + pre-split EPS 44.22 — secondary ⚠.*2023 股息含股票股利(分割前現金 19.972+股票 1.948,÷4)。2022 營收/純益由公司美元揭露+分割前 EPS 44.22 反推 — 次級來源 ⚠。
Ten terms to read the rest of this page. Basis: Yageo's own investor deck + web-verified industry frameworks.
看懂本文其餘章節需要的十個術語。依據:國巨自家法說簡報 + 上網查證的產業框架。
Finding: MLCC is only 19% of revenue. Consensus talks about Yageo as an "MLCC name" riding the passive-component super-cycle. The 1Q26 deck shows a much more diversified book: magnetics leads at 25.2%, tantalum capacitors 24.3%, MLCC third at 19.0%, resistors 13.5%, sensors 13.0%, other 5.0% ✓ deck. Pricing the whole company off the MLCC headline cuts both ways — it overstates blended ASP leverage on the way up, and understates the floor mix diversification provides on the way down.
發現:MLCC 只佔營收 19%。市場共識把國巨當成「MLCC 概念股」,搭被動元件超級循環的順風車。但 1Q26 法說簡報顯示組合遠比想像分散:磁性元件居冠 25.2%、鉭質電容 24.3%、MLCC 排第三 19.0%、電阻 13.5%、傳感器 13.0%、其他 5.0% ✓ deck。用 MLCC 的漲價頭條替全公司定價,其實兩面都會出錯 — 上漲時高估了混合 ASP 的槓桿,下跌時又低估了組合分散帶來的底部支撐。
~1.1 trillion components/year ÷ ~US$4.26B annual revenue (FY25's NT$132,930M) ≈ US$0.004/unit blended ✓ deck + computed. Mix business: premium parts (auto/industrial/medical/defense/AI) carry ASPs 10–100× commodity. The gross-margin gap vs Murata persists ~4pp (38.1% vs ~42%).
約 1.1 兆顆/年 ÷ 年營收約 US$4.26B(FY25 NT$132,930M 換算)≈ US$0.004/顆(blended)✓ deck + computed。組合生意:特殊品(車用/工業/醫療/國防/AI)ASP 是商規品的 10–100 倍。與 Murata 毛利率差距持續約 4 個百分點(38.1% vs ~42%)。
Company claim: Yageo parts sit inside "anything that plugs in, switches on, or runs on a battery." ⚠ co. That breadth is why the product-mix chart above matters more than any single line item — the company's fate rides on the blend, not on MLCC alone.
公司宣稱:任何「可插電、可開關、或使用電池」的裝置,都用得到國巨的零件 ⚠ 公司宣稱。正因為這種廣度,上方產品組合圖比任何單一品項都更重要 — 公司命運繫於整體組合,而非 MLCC 單一線。
This is the structural×cyclical hybrid mechanism behind 2026's hikes. AI rack content roughly doubles generation-over-generation (Rubin vs GB200); Japan/Korea's premier makers redirect high-end capacity to AI parts, running utilization 90–95% with book-to-bill 1.25–1.31; that pulls standard-part capacity away from the market, leaving a gap that channel inventory (down to 1–1.5 months vs a 4.5-month norm) can't absorb — hence the 7/1 price hikes of 30–80%. The counter-force: 2027 capacity coming online from Murata, SEMCO and Taiyo Yuden in Japan/Korea, plus China's Sanhuan and Fenghua adding 4.5B+ pieces/month, carries a 15–25% ASP giveback risk once it lands.
這是本輪 2026 年漲價背後「結構性×循環性」混合的機制。AI 機櫃含量每個世代大約翻倍(Rubin vs GB200);日韓龍頭廠把高階產能轉向 AI 相關產品,稼動率衝上 90-95%、B/B 值 1.25-1.31;這把標準品產能抽走,留下的缺口是通路庫存(已降到 1-1.5 個月,正常水準 4.5 個月)填不了的 — 因此才有 7/1 的 30-80% 漲價。反制力量:2027 年村田、SEMCO、太誘在日韓的新產能,加上中國三環、風華每月增產 4.5B+ 顆,一旦落地將帶來 15-25% 的 ASP 回吐風險。
Coverage-lite quarterly model — the company gives only qualitative guidance ("small sequential increase"), so every E-cell below is this analysis's estimate, basis stated in the table caption.
Coverage-lite 季度模型 — 公司僅給定性指引(「小幅季增」),因此下表每個 E 欄位皆為本研究估計,依據列於表格說明。
| 1Q26A | 2Q26E | 3Q26E | 4Q26E | 1Q27E | 2Q27E | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue營收 | 38,166 | 44,456* | 50,000 ◆ | 53,500 ◆ | 52,500 ◆ | 55,000 ◆ |
| Gross margin毛利率 | 38.1% | ~39.3% ◆ | 41.5% ◆ | 43.5% ◆ | 44.0% ◆ | 44.5% ◆ |
| Operating margin營益率 | 25.2% | ~26.3% ◆ | 28.5% ◆ | 30.5% ◆ | 31.0% ◆ | 31.5% ◆ |
| EPS (NT$) | 3.90 | ~4.63 ◆ | 5.05 ◆ | 5.85 ◆ | 6.15 ◆ | 6.55 ◆ |
*2Q26 revenue = company self-reported (自結) actual ✓; margins/EPS are this analysis's estimate (company guided only "small sequential increase"). Cross-check: a surveyed-consensus figure relayed by ftnn puts 2Q26 GM at ~39.1% and EPS at ~4.85 ✓ ftnn·07 vs this analysis's 39.3% / 4.63 ◆ — same direction, slightly different mix assumptions. EPS deliberately carries a wider margin-to-EPS wedge than 1Q26's (effective tax ~22–24% + conservative non-operating line — FX losses recur in this book: NT$415M in 2Q25, more in 1Q26) ◆. The official 2Q26 P&L (late July) is the first scorecard for both.*2Q26 營收為公司自結實際數 ✓;毛利率/EPS 為本研究估計(公司僅指引「小幅季增」)。交叉核對:ftnn 轉述的市場調查估 2Q26 毛利率約 39.1%、EPS 約 4.85 ✓ ftnn·07,vs 本研究 39.3%/4.63 ◆ — 方向一致、組合假設略異。EPS 相對利潤率路徑刻意留了較寬的缺口(有效稅率約 22–24%+業外偏保守 — 匯損在本股是常客:2Q25 匯損 NT$4.15億、1Q26 亦有)◆。7 月底的正式 2Q26 財報,是兩者的第一張成績單。
No free TW consensus feed exists for Yageo — the table below is named, dated, single-house estimates, not an aggregated consensus.
國巨沒有免費的台股共識數據源可用 — 下表是有名有姓、標註日期的單一機構估計,不是彙整共識。
| 2026E EPS | 2027E EPS | 2028E EPS | TP | Date日期 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| This analysis本研究 ◆ | 19.4 | 26.5 | not modeled (the slope is the main disagreement)不建模(斜率為主要爭點) | 585 (22×'27E) | 07-13 |
| FactSet survey consensusFactSet 調查共識 ✓ | 19.59 median (16.98–21.22)中位數 19.59(16.98–21.22) | — | — | 1,275 | 07 (via ftnn)07(ftnn 轉述) |
| Goldman Sachs | 21.2 | 37.6 | 57.3 | 1,490 (26×'28E) | 07-06 |
| Citi | 17.81 | 31.42 | 43.24 | 1,500 (40× PE) | 06-09 |
| Morgan Stanley | — | bull 45多方情境 45 | bull 60多方情境 60 | 1,515 | 06-24 |
| 宏遠證券 | 18.69 | — | — | 1,230 | 07-07 |
| Unnamed US bank未具名美系 | 18.2 | 30.7 | 42.6 | — | 06-15 |
On 2026 there is no real disagreement left: this analysis's 19.4 sits on top of FactSet's consensus median 19.59, itself revised up from 15.72 (mid-June) → 18.89 → 19.59 in roughly three weeks — consensus is chasing the tape at +25% per month ✓. The divergence is entirely 2027-28: external houses assume hikes of +93%/'27 and +84%/'28 (GS), while this analysis assumes hike momentum stalls mid-2027 as capacity lands. The velocity of consensus revision is itself a caution: numbers being marked up this fast are extrapolations of the steepest part of the curve, not settled forecasts.
2026 已經沒有真正的分歧:本研究 19.4 與 FactSet 共識中位數 19.59 幾乎重疊,而共識自己在約三週內從 15.72(6月中)→ 18.89 → 19.59 一路上修 — 共識正以每月 +25% 的速度追行情 ✓。分歧全在 2027-28:外資假設漲價 +93%/'27、+84%/'28(GS),本研究假設 2027 年中隨產能落地動能熄火。共識上修的速度本身就是警訊:被這麼快改寫的數字,是曲線最陡段的外插,不是穩定下來的預測。
| Date日期 | Event事件 | Magnitude漲幅 |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-02 | Resistor (R-chip) price hike電阻(R-chip)漲價 | +15–20% |
| 2026-03 | KEMET tantalum, 3rd hikeKEMET 鉭質電容第三次漲價 | — ⚠ magnitude undisclosed未揭露幅度 |
| 2026-04 | Taiyo Yuden (6976.T) hike太陽誘電 Taiyo Yuden (6976.T) 漲價 | +6–13% |
| 2026-07-01 | Yageo full capacitor-line hike, first incl. direct OEM/EMS — capacitors ≈40%+ of revenue國巨全電容產品線漲價,首次含直供OEM/EMS — 電容合計約佔營收4成以上 | +30–80% |
At 816: 64× TTM, 42× 2026E (this analysis), 26× consensus-2027E (~31.4 median of named houses). Goldman's 1,490 is exactly 26× its 2028E EPS of 57.3 — meaning today's price already applies that same bull multiple to consensus 2027. What's priced in: the full 2026 hike cycle, 2027 EPS ~30+, AI mix expansion, Shibaura integration. What's not priced in (either direction): the 2028 slope — +50% (GS 57.3) vs flat/down (this analysis) — 2027 capacity-response timing, and consumer pull-in unwind.
在 816:TTM 64×、2026E(本研究) 42×、共識2027E 26×(外資約 31.4× median)。Goldman 的 1,490 恰好 = 26 × 其 2028E EPS 57.3 — 也就是說 今天的股價已經把同一個多方倍數套用在共識 2027 上了。已反映:2026 全年漲價循環、2027 EPS ~30+、AI mix 擴張、芝浦整合。未反映(不論方向):2028 斜率 — +50%(GS 57.3) vs 持平/下修(本研究)— 2027 產能反應時間點、消費性拉貨提前透支的回吐。
This analysis models 2026/2027 EPS at NT$19.4/26.5; 12-month target price NT$585, based on 2027E EPS × 22× PER; the past three years' PER band runs roughly 10–20× (2018 peak ~16×). 22× is granted — above the historical range's upper edge — because premium mix (75–80% structural) and AI structural content lift the earnings floor above history; but this analysis rejects external houses' 26–40×, since that multiple implies 2028 EPS keeps compounding 50%+, an unproven option, and this stock's history shows the multiple compresses before the earnings peak at every cycle turn.
本研究預估 2026、2027 年 EPS 為 19.4、26.5 元,12個月目標價 585 元,基於 2027E EPS × 22 倍 PER;過去三年 PER 約 10–20 倍(2018 頂點 ~16 倍)。給予 22 倍(高於區間上緣)係因:premium mix 75-80% 結構性墊高獲利底部 + AI 為多年期需求 — 但拒絕外資 26-40 倍,因該倍數隱含 2028 EPS 續增 50%+,屬未證實選擇權,且本股歷史上循環轉折時倍數皆先於獲利頂點壓縮。
⚠ P/B cross-check: ~9.9× (BVPS ~NT$82, derived from equity ~NT$169.1bn ÷ 2.073bn shares; aggregator-sourced, MOPS pull recommended) vs ROE ~21–25%E — P/B and ROE are internally consistent with a high-cycle price, not an additional margin of safety.P/B 交叉檢查:~9.9×(BVPS約NT$82,由權益約NT$1,691億÷20.73億股推算;aggregator來源,建議再拉MOPS核實)vs ROE ~21-25%E — P/B 與 ROE 一致於高循環定價,並非額外的安全邊際。
Book-to-bill exceeds the 2018 peak; channel inventory sits at a decade low; TrendForce's Q4'26 escalation window is still ahead — sequential blowout prints are nearly certain: this analysis's own model runs EPS 3.90→4.63→5.05→5.85. Is this in guidance? Only partially — the company guided just "moderate" for Q2, and the July hike's impact isn't in any company guidance yet. ✓
Premium mix 75–80%, MLCC only 19% of revenue, tantalum #1 + >30% AI-related, plus a sensor leg. Trough gross margin is now proven higher (33.5% in 2023 vs ~25% pre-2018). ✓
Rack MLCC dollar content +182% from GB300 to VR200; TDK is guiding 10× growth in AI passives; Yageo's own AI revenue went 4%→15% in under two years. The structural leg is genuinely early. ✓
FCF NT$7.75bn/quarter, net debt/EBITDA 0.33×, twA+ stable rating. Chairman Chen's serial-consolidator track record (won the Shibaura bidding war against Minebea; 茂達 platform next) is real optionality. ✓
Unproven optionality未證實選擇權: 2028 EPS 43–57 (external houses), a possible liquid-cooling M&A, and 茂達 power-IC platform synergy — none of these are in this analysis's base case.
未證實選擇權:2028 EPS 43–57(外資)、可能的液冷併購、茂達平台綜效 — 皆不在本研究的基準情境中。
42× on what may be cycle-peak-level EPS, vs a 10–20× history. In 2018, the multiple compressed before peak EPS printed — the stock peaked Jul-2018, but peak quarterly EPS came later. The -33%/6-session break, with settlement defaults and disposition-list history (+127.67%/30 sessions), shows the shareholder register is momentum-heavy (450,000 retail holders). ✓
Murata's ¥80bn server-MLCC plant, SEMCO's two plants, and Taiyo Yuden Korea all land in 2027; Chinese makers add 4.5B+ pieces/month; TrendForce flags a 15–25% standard-ASP giveback risk for '27-28. ✓
Consumer units are shrinking (phones -13.9%, PCs -10.4%); OEM pre-buying ahead of the hikes is classic double-ordering fuel; TDK's auto passives OP fell 54% YoY, showing auto is soft. If AI capex plateaus, the crowd-out mechanism reverses fast. ✓
Hikes must stick through 2027; AI rack units must keep compounding; China must stay locked out of premium sockets; no macro shock (IDC already cites the US-Iran conflict and the memory-cost crisis cutting device demand).
Consensus (post-rerating) reads Yageo as an MLCC super-cycle name, the strongest in 20 years — buy the leader: FactSet's surveyed consensus TP is 1,275, with individual houses at 1,490–1,515 (GS/Citi/MS). The market may be roughly right about 2026-27 earnings direction — no variant there. The variant is narrower and sits in what the market is overweighting vs what it's ignoring.
市場共識(重新評價後)把國巨讀成「MLCC 超級循環股,20年最強」— 買龍頭:FactSet 調查共識目標價 1,275,外資個別喊到 1,490–1,515(GS/Citi/MS)。市場對 2026-27 獲利方向大致可能是對的 — 那裡沒有變異觀點。變異之處更窄,在於市場過度加權了什麼、又忽略了什麼。
Honest reverse variant: if Q4'26 tips into a full shortage, consensus 2027 estimates go higher, and 816 will have been the entry point. That is the 30%-weight bull scenario in this analysis's own framework (§ scenarios below) — not the base case, but not dismissed either.
誠實的反向變異觀點:若 2026 第四季真的轉為全面缺貨,共識 2027 估計將上修,816 屆時就會是進場點。這正是本研究自己框架中權重 30% 的多方情境(詳下方機率加權情境)— 不是基準情境,但也不能被忽視。
| Timing時間 | Event事件 | Status狀態 |
|---|---|---|
| Jul–Aug 2026 | 2Q26 full P&L (per the 45-day disclosure rule)2Q26 完整損益表(依45天揭露規則) | scheduled已排定 |
| ~Aug 10 | July monthly revenue — first full month reflecting the 7/1 hikes7月營收 — 首月完整反映7/1漲價 | scheduled已排定 |
| 3Q26 | Direct-customer contract reset +30–40% (MS estimate)直供客戶合約重議 +30-40%(MS估) | speculative推測 |
| 4Q26 | TrendForce's critical window for full shortageTrendForce 全面缺貨關鍵窗口 | speculative推測 |
| 2H26 | VR200 / Vera Rubin rack rampVR200/Vera Rubin 機櫃放量 | roadmap, timing risk已排定藍圖,時間點有風險 |
| 1H27 | Murata/SEMCO/TY new capacity, first output (bear catalyst)村田/SEMCO/太誘新產能首次投產(空方催化劑) | planned已排定計畫 |
| Ongoing持續 | Monthly revenue prints ~10th; possible liquid-cooling M&A announcement每月約10日公布月營收;可能的液冷併購公告 | speculative推測 |
Founder-chairman Pierre Chen (陳泰銘) is THE serial consolidator in Taiwan's passive-components industry — the acquisitions below are the through-line of the whole company strategy.
創辦人暨董事長陳泰銘,是台灣被動元件產業「連續併購」的代表人物 — 下方的收購紀錄,就是整個公司策略的主軸。
Foreign institutions hold 48.58% (07-09; May-08 peak 53.19%, trimmed ~4.6pp into the correction) ✓; directors/supervisors ~7.6% ✓. The Chen family holds ~6.8% via the 陳氏傳承/泰銘傳承 succession vehicles (Oct-24/Mar-25 transfers = estate planning, NOT open-market sales) ⚠ derived; daughter 陳少喬 (Wharton, ex-UBS) joined the board in 2025 ✓. No insider open-market selling found in 2025-26 ✓. Retail register is heavy: ~450k shareholders after the run ✓.
外資持股 48.58%(07-09;5/8 高點 53.19%,其後調節約 4.6 個百分點)✓;董監約 7.6% ✓。陳家透過「陳氏傳承/泰銘傳承」控股公司持有約 6.8%(2024/10、2025/03 的移轉屬接班規劃,並非市場賣出)⚠ 推算;女兒陳少喬(Wharton、前 UBS)2025 年進入董事會 ✓。2025-26 未發現內部人公開市場賣股 ✓。散戶籌碼沉重:大漲後股東人數約 45 萬 ✓。
FY2025 cash dividend NT$5.998 (~6.00), payout 52%, paid 2026-07-03 ✓; policy floor: cash ≥50% of any distribution ✓ annual report. Yield at 816 = 0.74% ✓. Leverage: net financial debt/EBITDA 0.33× (company, post-Shibaura peak 0.59×) ✓ deck vs ~1.5× gross projected by Taiwan Ratings (twA+/stable — definitions differ ⚠). 2020 GDR raised US$650M for KEMET; no equity raise since; no live buyback found (verify on MOPS ⚠). Shibaura was funded with cash + debt, no new shares ✓.
FY2025 現金股利 NT$5.998(約 6 元),配發率 52%,2026-07-03 發放 ✓;政策下限:現金 ≥ 股利總額 50% ✓ 年報。以 816 計殖利率 0.74% ✓。槓桿:淨金融負債/EBITDA 0.33×(公司口徑,併芝浦後高點 0.59×)✓ 法說,vs Taiwan Ratings 預估總負債口徑約 1.5×(twA+/穩定 — 兩者定義不同 ⚠)。2020 年為併 KEMET 發 GDR 募資 US$650M;其後無增資;未發現進行中庫藏股(建議 MOPS 再核 ⚠)。芝浦以現金+借款支應,未發新股 ✓。
China exposure: 21 of 65 plants are in China; Greater China customer mix is 24% (down from ~70% pre-2018 — this is the asymmetry the 2018 comparison misses).
中國曝險:65座廠中21座在中國;大中華客戶佔比24%(相較 2018 前約 70% — 這正是「2018 對比」容易忽略的不對稱之處)。
| Product / segment產品/分部 | Share claim市占宣稱 | Verdict判定 |
|---|---|---|
| Resistors電阻 | #1, >30% capacity產能 | ⚠ company公司宣稱 |
| MLCC | #3 by capacity >15% (company) vs #5 by revenue 7-9% (aggregators)按產能#3>15%(公司) vs 按營收#5 7-9%(aggregator) | ⚠ conflict — both shown來源衝突 — 兩者並陳 |
| Polymer tantalum聚合物鉭 | #1, >40% capacity產能 | ⚠ company公司宣稱 |
| Network transformers網路變壓器 | #1 | ⚠ company公司宣稱 |
| NTC (Shibaura)(芝浦) | #1, 13.5–20%+ (sources conflict)13.5-20%+(來源不一) | ⚠ conflict來源衝突 |
| Player (ticker)玩家(代號) | Where they're strong強在哪 | vs Yageo與國巨的關係 |
|---|---|---|
| Murata (6981.T)村田製作所 Murata(6981.T) | Hardest high-end MLCC; ¥250bn capex incl. ¥80bn server-MLCC最難打的高階MLCC;資本支出¥2,500億、含¥800億伺服器MLCC | GM ~42% ✓;2027 capacity = bear catalyst2027新產能=空方催化劑 |
| Samsung Electro-Mechanics (009150.KS)三星電機 SEMCO(009150.KS) | ₩454B AI-MLCC order; Philippines/Tianjin plants 2027₩4,540億AI-MLCC訂單;菲律賓/天津廠2027 | OP +93% YoY — same cycle, higher tier營益YoY +93% — 同循環、更高階 ✓ |
| Taiyo Yuden (6976.T)太陽誘電 Taiyo Yuden(6976.T) | High-end MLCC; new Korea plant not done until 2027高階MLCC;韓國新廠2027年才完工 | hiked +6–13% Apr; part of the 2027 capacity wave4月漲價6–13%;2027產能波的一員 ✓ |
| TDK (6762.T)TDK(6762.T) | Broad passives; guiding 10× AI data-center passive sales被動元件廣度;喊AI資料中心被動元件營收10倍 | auto passives weak (OP -54% YoY) — echoes Yageo's soft 17.1% auto book車用疲弱(營益YoY -54%)— 呼應國巨17.1%車用部位偏軟 ✓ |
| Walsin Technology (2492.TT)華新科 Walsin(2492.TT) | TW peer; MLCC mix 46.4% of revenue (1Q26)台股同業;MLCC占營收46.4%(1Q26) | higher MLCC beta than Yageo (19%) — a cleaner pure-play echo / leading indicatorMLCC彈性比國巨(19%)更大 — 更純的族群風向球/領先指標 ✓ |
| Sanhuan (300408.SZ) + Fenghua (000636.SZ)三環集團(300408.SZ)+風華高科(000636.SZ) | Standard-only, <8-10% combined share; +4.5B pcs/mo capacity by 2027僅標準品,合計市占<8-10%;2027年前月產能+45億顆 | 15-25% underbid; "de-Yageo" qualification attempts post-hike; the 2027-28 ASP-giveback source削價15-25%;漲價後有「去國巨化」認證嘗試;2027-28 ASP回吐的來源 ⚠ |
| TW sector sympathy: 禾伸堂 Holy Stone (3026.TT), 蜜望實 (8043.TT)台股同族群外溢:禾伸堂(3026.TT)、蜜望實(8043.TT) | Rode the same rerating — multiple limit-ups on 6/15 after Citi's upgrade wave同一波重估 — 6/15 Citi升評潮後族群多檔漲停 ✓ | sector beta, not direct competitors — gauges how much of the move is theme money族群 beta,非直接競爭 — 可衡量行情中有多少是題材資金 |
| Scenario情境 | Prob.機率 | 2027E EPS | PER | Price價位 | Trigger觸發條件 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear空方 | 20% | 20 | 14× | 280 | Hikes reverse by 1H27: China capacity + consumer collapse + AI digestion1H27前漲價反轉:中國產能+消費崩跌+AI消化 |
| Base基準 | 50% | 26.5 | 21× | 557 | Hikes stick into 1H27 then plateau as capacity lands漲價撐到1H27後隨產能落地趨緩 |
| Bull多方 | 30% | ~36.5 | 26× | 950 | Q4'26 full shortage; 2028 visibly growing on Rubin content4Q26全面缺貨;2028在Rubin含量下明顯成長 |
To double from 816 (→1,632): the target would sit above every published TP, including the street's highest (MS 1,515) — it needs 2027E EPS ~40+ held at 40×, or 2028E ~57 (GS's high case) at 28×, i.e. both the highest published EPS path and a multiple this stock has never sustained through a cycle turn. Even just reaching FactSet's consensus TP of 1,275 (+56%) requires the market to keep paying ~26–28× consensus 2027E (~31) all the way into the window when the 2027 capacity wave becomes visible — precisely the multiple this analysis declines to underwrite. The company gives no EPS targets; every 2028 number is a broker construct. To fall 50% (→408): merely requires 2027E EPS 20 × 20× — the hike cycle stalling on schedule alongside the 2027 capacity wave. Downside needs far fewer heroic assumptions than upside. Asymmetry at 816 is negative; the entire gap between this analysis (585) and consensus (1,275) rides on two variables — the 2027-28 EPS slope, and whether the multiple survives the cycle turn.
要從 816 翻倍(→1,632):這個價位高於所有已發布目標價,包括外資最高的 MS 1,515 — 需要 2027E EPS 40+ 且維持 40 倍,或 2028E ~57(GS 高標)且維持 28 倍,亦即同時成立「已發布估計中最高的 EPS 路徑」與「本股歷史上循環轉折時從未維持過的倍數」。即使只是漲回 FactSet 共識目標價 1,275(+56%),也需要市場在「2027 產能波逐漸可見」的窗口內,持續給共識 2027E(約 31)26–28 倍 — 這正是本研究拒絕承作的倍數。公司未給出 EPS 目標;所有 2028 數字皆為外資自行構建。要下跌 50%(→408):只需要 2027E EPS 20 × 20× — 漲價循環按時程停滯、恰逢 2027 產能波落地。下檔所需的假設比上檔少得多。816 的不對稱性是負向的;本研究(585)與共識(1,275)之間的整段差距,全押在兩個變數上 — 2027-28 的 EPS 斜率,以及倍數能否撐過循環轉折。
| Claim主張 | Verdict判定 | Value · source · as-of數值 · 來源 · 日期 |
|---|---|---|
| Price & valuation · live 2026-07-13價格與估值 · 即時 2026-07-13 | ||
| 1. Last / -9.33% / open 921 / low 810收盤/-9.33%/開盤921/低點810 | ✓ IBKR+LTN | 816 · 07-13 |
| 2. 52wk range; YTD +253.25%52週區間;YTD+253.25% | ✓ IBKR | 120.75–1,220 |
| 3. Share count股數 | ✓ 工商時報 | 2,072,965,820 · 08-25 |
| 4. Market cap市值 | ✓ computed計算 | NT$1.69兆 |
| 5. TTM EPS 12.69TTM EPS 12.69 | ✓ quarterly sums季度加總 | cnyes/deck |
| 6. TTM PER 64.3× | ✓ recomputed live現價重算 | — |
| 7. BVPS ~82 / PBR ~9.9×BVPS約82/PBR約9.9× | ⚠ aggregatoraggregator推算 | MOPS pull recommended建議再拉MOPS |
| 8. Dividend, yield股息、殖利率 | ✓ 鉅亨/AGM | 5.998 · 07-03 · 0.74% |
| 9. 1-for-4 split, "國巨*" marker1拆4,「國巨*」標記 | ✓ 工商時報/sinotrade | 2025-08-25 |
| Financials & guidance財務與指引 | ||
| 10. FY23/24/25 revenue營收 | ✓ multi-source多方來源 | 107,609/121,667/132,930 |
| 11. FY23/24/25 gross margin毛利率 | ✓ multi-source多方來源 | 33.48/34.36/36.21% |
| 12. FY25 NI, EPS | ✓ cnyes/sinotrade | 23,634 (+22.1%) · 11.51 |
| 13. 1Q26 results (rev/GM/OM/EBITDA/NI/EPS)業績(營收/毛利率/營益率/EBITDA/純益/EPS) | ✓ company deck公司法說簡報 | 38,166 · 38.1% · 25.2% · 31.7% · 8,001 · 3.90 |
| 14. 2Q26 self-reported revenue自結營收 | ✓ 工商時報 | 44,456 (QoQ+16.5%,YoY+35.7%) · 07-08 |
| 15. Monthly 2026 (Jun record, 1H sum)2026月營收(6月新高,上半年合計) | ✓ cnyes | 15,359(+38.9%) · 82,622(+29.4%) · 07-10 |
| 16. Guidance (Q2 moderate; utilization; B/B>1)財測(Q2小幅增;稼動率;B/B>1) | ✓ call notes/AGM法說會/AGM | fugle/stockfeel/CNA |
| 17. AI mix ~15%AI占比約15% | ✓ AI Summit deckAI峰會簡報 | 4%→15% in於 <2yrs |
| 18. FCF by quarter各季自由現金流 | ✓ deck法說簡報 | 3,600→6,847→8,742→7,752 |
| 19. Net debt/EBITDA淨負債/EBITDA | ⚠ definition conflict定義衝突 | 59%→33%(co.) vs 1.3-1.6×(Taiwan Ratings) |
| 20. 2026E/2027E estimates估計 | ◆ judgment判斷 | EPS 19.4/26.5, rev 186.1B/227B |
| 21. FY2020-21 EPS (pre-split)FY2020-21 EPS(分割前) | ⚠ aggregator-only僅aggregator | 25.52/46.46 |
| Business & mix (deck-verified)本業與組合(法說簡報查證) | ||
| 22. Product mix產品組合 | ✓ deck | 25.2/24.3/19.0/13.5/13.0/5.0 |
| 23. End-market mix終端市場組合 | ✓ deck | 29.0/24.9/17.1/13.0/11.7/4.3 |
| 24. Channel / region mix通路/地區組合 | ✓ deck | 44.6/35.0/20.4; 49.6/29.9/20.5 |
| 25. Unit economics單位經濟 | ✓ deck+computed法說簡報+計算 | 1.1T units → ~$0.004/unit |
| 26. Share claims (R/MLCC/Ta/transformers)市占宣稱(電阻/MLCC/鉭/變壓器) | ⚠ company-asserted公司宣稱 | #1>30% / #3>15% / #1>40% / #1 |
| 27. MLCC #5 by revenue (aggregators)MLCC按營收#5(aggregator) | ⚠ conflict w/ #26與#26衝突 | 7-9% |
| 28. Premium/specialty mix特殊品占比 | ✓ slides+call簡報+法說會 | 75-80% |
| 29. GM vs Murata毛利率對比Murata | ✓ compiled彙整 | 38.1% vs ~41-42% |
| 30. 90% BOM coverage覆蓋率 | ⚠ company claim公司宣稱 | deck |
| Industry & cycle產業與循環 | ||
| 31. B/B Murata/SEMCO/TY vs 2018 peakMurata/SEMCO/太誘 vs 2018峰值 | ✓ TrendForce | 1.30/1.31/1.25 vs 1.25 · 07-06 |
| 32. Channel inventory / lead times通路庫存/交期 | ✓ FindChips/773grp | 1-1.5mo vs 4.5 norm常態 |
| 33. Spot / AI-cap price rises現貨/AI高容漲幅 | ✓ TrendForce | +15-20% / +50-60% · 06-25 |
| 34. Yageo 7/1 hike漲價 | ✓ 工商時報/TrendForce | +30-80% |
| 35. Hike log (Feb R-chip, Mar KEMET, Apr TY)漲價紀錄(2月電阻,3月KEMET,4月太誘) | ✓ dated log已標日期 | +15-20% / — / +6-13% |
| 36. Yageo AI-capacity share '25-28產能占比'25-28 | ⚠ broker-derived外資推算 | 9→14→24→32% · TechNews 07-06 |
| 37. Utilization high-end vs std稼動率高階vs標準 | ✓ TrendForce/efrontrade | 90-95% vs 60-70% |
| 38. MLCC content ladder (server→Rubin→rack)MLCC含量階梯(伺服器→Rubin→機櫃) | ✓ TrendForce/MS | 2,200→12,000; rack $1,530→$4,320(+182%) |
| 39. Phones/PC units 2026手機/PC出貨2026 | ✓ IDC/Gartner | -13.9% / -10.4~11.3% |
| 40. AI servers units/value share伺服器出貨/價值占比 | ✓ TrendForce | +28% units出貨; 74% of value價值占比 |
| 41. CN makers share / giveback risk中國廠市占/回吐風險 | ⚠ scenario-flagged情境標註 | <8-10%; 15-25% risk風險 |
| 42. EV MLCC multiplier倍數 | ✓ Murata-attributed | 3-6× (up to最高達 20×+) |
| Corporate governance & ownership公司治理與籌碼 | ||
| 43. Shibaura bid sequence/timeline競購序列/時間軸 | ✓ multi-source多方來源 | 4,300→7,130 · delisted下市 01-13 |
| 44. Ownership (foreign/insider/family)持股(外資/董監/家族) | ⚠ family% derived家族%為推算 | 48.58% / ~7.6% / ~6.8% |
| 45. Disposition / settlement default / holder count處置/違約交割/股東人數 | ✓ ETtoday/NOWnews/LTN/ftnn | +127.67%/30d · 6/30 NT$38.8M→NT$41.31M×13 · 45萬 holders股東 |
| 46. Sell-side TPs & survey consensus外資目標價與調查共識 | ✓ all named+dated皆具名標日 | FactSet consensus TP 1,275 · 2026E median 19.59 (16.98–21.22, prior 18.89; via ftnn, 07) / GS 1,490 / MS 1,515 / Citi 495→1,500 / 宏遠 1,230 / JPM 1,010 / Nomura 850 / HSBC 650FactSet 共識TP 1,275 · 2026E中位數 19.59(16.98–21.22,前版18.89;ftnn轉述,07月)/ GS 1,490 / MS 1,515 / Citi 495→1,500 / 宏遠 1,230 / JPM 1,010 / Nomura 850 / HSBC 650 |
| 47. -33%/6-session break, no fundamental news6交易日-33%,無基本面消息 | ✓ LTN/Yahoo | 07-13 |
| Judgment (not the 47 enumerated claims)判斷(不計入47筆列舉) | ||
| TP formula (2027E×22×)目標價公式(2027E×22×) | ◆ | 585 |
| Scenario probabilities情境機率 | ◆ | 20/50/30 → weighted加權 620 |
Counts: 47 claims enumerated → 39 ✓ verified · 5 ⚠ flagged-partial (BVPS, family %, 2020-21 EPS, leverage definitions, MLCC #3-vs-#5) · 1 ◆ judgment (2026E/27E estimates) within the 47, plus 2 further ◆ judgment calls outside the enumerated set (TP formula, scenario probabilities) — 3 ◆ total referenced in this analysis.統計:47筆列舉主張 → 39✓已查證 · 5⚠部分標註(BVPS、家族持股%、2020-21 EPS、槓桿定義、MLCC#3-vs-#5) · 47筆內1◆判斷(2026E/27E估計),另有2項◆判斷不計入47筆列舉(目標價公式、情境機率) — 全文共3◆判斷。
Dropped (4, couldn't verify → excluded): a 36kr $12k-40k/rack MLCC-content figure (8× conflict with the TrendForce/MS-cited set); a "15,000-25,000 MLCC per AI motherboard" claim (untraceable); Shibaura EPS accretion % (never disclosed); KEMET synergy target (never quantified). Separately (not dropped, verified as absent): no 2025-26 buyback found on MOPS — stated in the management section as "no live buyback" with a verify note.剔除(4筆,無法查證→排除):36kr 的 $12k-40k/機櫃 MLCC含量數字(與TrendForce/MS引用的資料組相差8倍);「每片AI主機板15,000-25,000顆MLCC」(無法溯源);芝浦EPS增厚%(從未揭露);KEMET綜效目標(從未量化)。另外(非剔除,而是查證為「不存在」):MOPS上未找到2025-26庫藏股 — 已在經營層章節註明「無現行庫藏股」並附查證說明。
| Date日期 | Action動作 | View觀點 | TP | Close收盤 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-13 | Initial coverage初次評估 | Avoid迴避 | 585 | 816 |
Append-only ledger. No revision table on this first build — there is no prior model to revise against.附加式(append-only)紀錄。首次建置無修正對照表 — 沒有前一版模型可供對照。